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Abstract 
Undervaluation of the currency is generally believed to affect growth through two main transmission channels: 
the “capital accumulation channel” and the “total factor productivity (TFP) growth channel”. This paper carries 
out the first empirical investigation on the TFP growth channel. More specifically, we provide answers to the 
three following questions: Does undervaluation of the currency boost the overall productivity level in the 
economy? If so, does this “undervaluation-induced” productivity improvement significantly enhance growth? 
And finally, what is the magnitude of the TFP growth channel compared to the capital accumulation channel? 
The analysis is conducted on a panel of 72 countries over 1970-2008. The results give strong support to the TFP 
growth channel: a 10% increase in undervaluation enhances growth on average by 0.14% via an improvement in 
productivity. Most interestingly, our estimates suggest that this channel conveys the most important part of the 
growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation. The model has been subject to various robustness checks to support 
these findings.    
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Introduction 
Does the value of the currency matter for economic performance? For the layperson, the answer to this 
question would be a straight “yes”. For economists however, it has a long history of debate. From the 
era of currency wars and competitive devaluations in the 1930s to the current debate on the real value 
of the Chinese renminbi, this question has always kept the interest of the profession. Modern debates 
oppose two main views. A first approach, often referred to as the “Washington consensus view”, holds 
that the value of the currency should be set at a level that is consistent with both internal and external 
balances (Krueger, 1983; Edwards, 1989; Williamson, 1990). Deviations of the exchange rate from 
this equilibrium level –in short, exchange rate misalignments– are associated with some sort of 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, regardless of the direction of the misalignment. Both undervaluation 
and overvaluation are argued to be harmful to growth, though avoiding overvaluation appears to be the 
main imperative as the latter is associated with losses of competitiveness, a squeeze on the tradable 
sector, and increasing odds of balance of payments and currency crises (see for example Cottani et al., 
1990; Ghura and Grennes, 1993; and Loayza et al., 2005). On the other hand, undervaluation is 
discredited on the grounds that it could “produce unnecessary inflationary pressures and also limit the 
resources available for domestic investment, and hence curb the growth of supply-side potential” 
(Williamson, 1990).   
However, as the China and other east-Asian countries’ success story came into the spotlight, the latter 
assertion has been called into question. Indeed, for a decade, some economists have refreshed an idea 
that has been discussed extensively in the post war literature: an active exchange rate undervaluation 
strategy can efficiently stimulate growth.2 The revival of this idea has since triggered an intense debate 
opposing advocators of this claim (Aguirre and Calderòn, 2005; Rodrik, 2008, inter alia), to more 
skeptical economists (Woodford, 2009; Nouira and Sekkat, 2012).  
Beyond the empirical documentation of this effect, a key aspect in this debate has been the 
identification of the transmission channels through which it is generated. The literature points towards 
two main channels. The first channel –known as the “capital accumulation channel”– refers to the 
claim that real exchange rate undervaluation enhances growth through an increase in the stock of 
capital in the economy. In fact, this view brings together two sources of capital accumulation. In the 
first mechanism, the capital accumulation operates exclusively in the tradable goods sector –whose 
share in GDP increases (Rodrik, 2008)– while in the second, the stock of capital increases through the 
expansion of overall savings and investment (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007 ; Bhalla, 2007).  
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 See Razin and Collins (1999), Dooley et al. (2003), Polterovich and Popov (2004), Hausmann et al. (2005), Aguirre and 
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The second transmission channel of the potential growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation –
commonly dubbed the “total factor productivity (TFP) growth channel”– places the structure of 
domestic production at the core of the analysis. A depreciated real exchange rate, equivalent to an 
increase in the price of tradable goods relative to non-tradables, improves the profitability of the 
tradable sector. As production responds to the price incentive and moves from the non-tradable to the 
tradable sector –characterized by a higher (marginal social) productivity–, the overall productivity in 
the economy increases. Such economy-wide productivity improvement ultimately fosters growth. This 
is to say, for example, that the alleged undervaluation of the renminbi affects China’s growth 
performance by subsidizing its tradable sector, which expansion is associated with greater 
productivity. The literature is not always explicit on the ways through which an increase in the size of 
the tradable sector can improve productivity (Eichengreen, 2008). Most accounts point towards some 
“learning by doing effects” (LBD) associated with the production of tradables. We will discuss this 
point in details in section 2.  
It is quite surprising to find no empirical test of this TFP growth channel considering its recurrence in 
the literature. Some early references can be traced back to Kaldor (1978). It has also been taken up 
recently by authors like Gala (2007), Aizenmann and Lee (2007), Eichengreen (2008), Rodrik (2009), 
as well as Korinek and Servèn (2010); but they did not provide empirical support for their arguments. 
Some papers, mostly in the Dutch disease literature, also studied the link between TFP and the real 
exchange rate but focused on the effects of real overvaluations.3 To our best knowledge, there is no 
empirical investigation on this transmission channel of the effect of undervaluation on growth. Filling 
this gap is the aim of this paper. More specifically, we provide answers to the three following 
questions: Does undervaluation of the currency boost the overall productivity level in the economy? If 
so, does this “undervaluation-induced” productivity improvement significantly enhance growth? And 
finally, what is the magnitude of the TFP growth channel compared to the capital accumulation 
channel?  
Our study is close to the recent paper by McLoed and Mileva (2011). Using simulations of a two-
sector open economy growth model based on Matsuyama (1992) and panel estimates for 58 countries, 
these authors conclude that a weaker real exchange rate can lead to a growth surge, as workers move 
from non-traded goods sectors with slower productivity growth to traded good industries characterized 
by more LBD. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental conceptual difference between our approach and 
that of these authors. We are testing in this paper whether (at least part of) the effect of real exchange 
rate undervaluation on growth operates through an economy-wide productivity improvement.  
McLoed and Mileva focus on the level (and not the misalignment) of the real exchange rate, solely 
discussing the appreciation and depreciation phases without any positioning with regard to the 
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 Even on the overvaluation side empirical evidences are mixed. A large strand of studies “paradoxically” finds that real 
exchange rate overvaluation improves productivity (see Krugman, 1989 inter alia). On the undervaluation side, an exception 
is Harris (2001) who finds a negative impact of undervaluation on productivity growth in the long term. 
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equilibrium real exchange rate. Our approach seems preferable as it takes into account the probable 
evolution of the equilibrium real exchange rate over time.  
Beyond the fact that it provides the first empirical investigation on the TFP growth channel, this paper 
extends the existing literature on at least two additional points. First, we provide an estimation of the 
relative magnitudes of the two competing operative channels in the literature: the TFP growth channel 
and the capital accumulation channel. Second, we compute the most up-to-date “enhanced-PPP” based 
undervaluation estimates, responding to the Subramanian (2010)’s recent call for re-estimation of 
existing figures of PPP-based undervaluation, which suffer from numerous problems (see section 3).  
Relying on a panel of 72 developing, emerging and developed countries over the 1970-2008 period, 
we find strong support for the TFP growth channel. On average, a 10% increase in undervaluation 
enhances growth by 0.17% via an improvement in productivity. Moreover, our estimates suggest that 
the most important part of the growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation passes through such 
productivity improvements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the mechanisms 
through which undervaluation of the currency could improve productivity. Section 3 presents the 
undervaluation indexes used in this paper. Section 4 carries out the empirical assessment of the TFP 
growth channel. Finally, Section 5 conducts a robustness test, and section 6 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
2. Why should currency undervaluation increase TFP? 
As stressed before, undervaluation of the currency is associated with a shift of production towards the 
tradable sector as the latter becomes more profitable. However, the literature is not always explicit on 
the mechanisms through which such a shift of production could improve productivity. It is generally 
referred to some “learning by doing effects” without being very clear on what is put under this generic 
term. In the following, we emphasize three channels through which an increase in the size of the 
tradable sector may improve productivity: a “pure composition effect’, a “learning by doing effect” 
and a “learning by doing externality effect”. 
The “learning by doing effect” refers to the capability of firms to improve their productivity as they 
accumulate experience on production. Productivity gains are typically achieved through practice and 
self-perfection. This LBD is associated with capital and/or production: firms improve their 
productivity either by investing or by producing. If such LBD effects are more present in the tradable 
sector than in the non-tradable sector, a shift of production towards tradables can foster productivity 
growth. Numerous empirical documentations of these effects can be found in the literature (see 
Ohashi, 2005). 
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Apart from this LBD internal to the firm, some externalities associated with LBD can spill to firms or 
sectors other than the one that actually undertakes the manufacturing. We refer to this as the “learning 
by doing externality effect”. The most obvious transmission channel of these externalities is labor 
mobility across firms or sectors. Trained workers in one firm can move to other firms (sectors), 
carrying with them the knowledge capital they have accumulated (through LBD) in their former job. 
This LBD externality effect is then primarily associated with labor. However, externalities associated 
with R&D and economies of scale can also enter these “LBD externality effects”.  
Unlike the previous two dynamic concepts, the third mechanism can operate in a static fashion. We 
suppose here for many reasons, including LBD effects and LBD externality effects among firms in the 
tradable sector, that the latter is fundamentally more productive than the non-tradable sector. In other 
words, at any point in time, productivity is higher in the tradable sector.4 Then, if this assumption is 
valid, reallocation of production from the non-tradables to the tradables can increase the overall 
productivity level in the economy even in static, generating a “pure composition effect”. Various 
empirical supports of this mechanism can be found in the literature. For example, McMillan and 
Rodrik (2011) argue that applying the developed countries inter-sectoral distribution of production to 
developing countries (holding unchanged their sectoral productivity levels) would entail productivity 
gains ranging from 100% for India to 1000% for Senegal.  
It is worth noting that these three effects are more likely to occur simultaneously following an 
undervaluation of the currency, making it hard to distinguish between them. In this sense, the overall 
productivity measure used in this paper provides a valuable feature by accounting for all of these three 
mechanisms (see section 4).        
3. Measuring undervaluation: methodology and data 
3.1. Methodology 
The question of the appropriate measurement of undervaluation is one of the most contentious issues 
in applied macroeconomics. Current controversies oppose economists on two main points. A first 
source of debate is the choice of approach, as several competing procedures are available, each 
applying to a certain time horizon or reflecting a particular definition of the “equilibrium real 
exchange rate”. The most popular ones are probably the “enhanced purchasing power parity” (PPP) 
approach, the so-called “fundamental equilibrium exchange rate” approach, (FEER, Williamson, 
1985) and the “behavioral equilibrium exchange rate” approach (BEER, Macdonald, 1997; Clark and 
Macdonald, 1998).5 A second controversy has been recently raised by authors like Nouira and Sekkat 
(2012) who cast doubts on the validity of existing empirical evidence on the impact of undervaluation, 
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 Some additional less used procedures can also be found in the literature, such as the natural equilibrium exchange rate 
(NATREX, Stein, 1994).  
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rightly pointing out that the latter are based, for the most part, on misalignment indexes capturing both 
undervaluation and overvaluation episodes.6 Thus, a positive correlation between these indexes and 
the growth rate could be only reflecting a strong anti-growth effect of overvaluation outweighing a 
non-significant effect of undervaluation.  
A constant effort is made throughout this paper not to let these controversies “pollute” the assessment 
of the question of primary interest here – which is the empirical investigation of the TFP growth 
channel. Each of the three aforementioned measures has its advantages and drawbacks.7 Accordingly, 
they should be considered as complementary rather than substitute. In this paper, we compute 
undervaluation indexes based on the two most routinely used undervaluation measurement approaches 
in the literature: enhanced-PPP and BEER. Moreover, we address the composition-effect criticism by 
systematically isolating the impact of undervaluation from that of overvaluation. Results based on the 
enhanced-PPP measure are presented in the main body while section 5 shows that our findings are 
robust to the use of both measures.  
Building on a long-standing tradition in economics (Froot and Rogoff, 1996; Coudert and Couharde, 
2005; and Rodrik, 2008 inter alia), the enhanced-PPP undervaluation index used in this paper is based 
on the standard PPP criterion, adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Its computation follows four 
steps.  
We first calculate the real exchange rate in level () or relative price level of GDP, as follows: 
log	 = log ⁄ 	 = log 	⁄   1	 
where  is the nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar,  is  
the PPP exchange rate,  is the price level in the U.S.A.,  is the price level in country  and  is an 
index for five year periods.8 This first step gives the simplest version of the PPP-based misalignment 
index. As absolute respect of PPP implies that   equals one, a positive value of log() 
reveals an undervaluation and a negative value implies an overvaluation of .  
The second step consists in adjusting this measure for the Balassa-Samuelson effect giving an 
“enhanced” misalignment index (Cline and Williamson, 2009). This is done by regressing  on 
the real GDP per capita ():  
log 	 =   +  log 	 +  +    2	 
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 Noteworthy exceptions are Aguirre and Calderòn (2005), and Béreau et al., (2012).  
7
 See Cline and Williamson (2008), comments from Frankel (2008) and Driver and Westaway (2005) for discussions on the 
merit of each measure; and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2010) on the complementarity of the different measures.  
8
 The inverse of the variable p in the Penn World Tables (called the “price level of GDP”) is equivalent to RER. We used p 
here as this series is more complete than  and . Moreover, unless explicitly stated otherwise, 5 years time periods 
are considered to smooth out short term movements in the variables. This procedure has however the drawback of reducing 
the number of degrees of freedom. We have also run the regressions with annual data and results are qualitatively similar. 
They are available upon request to authors.   
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where  is a full set of time fixed effects and  is the error term. The coefficient  tells us on average 
how much a country’s real exchange rate tends to appreciate as it becomes richer (as predicted by 
Balassa-Samuelson). Then, the fitted value from this equation (log(!"#		 captures the part of 
changes in RER that can be seen as “natural”, i.e. the fraction that does not reflect any misalignment of 
the currency. Removing the latter from the current value of  gives us therefore an enhanced-PPP 
misalignment index ($%&&&): 
$%&&& = log	 − log!"#	   3	 
A positive value of $%&&& indicates that the exchange rate is set such that the price level at home is 
lower than predicted by purchasing power parity: the real exchange rate is undervalued. Conversely, a 
negative value of $%&&& implies that the real exchange rate is overvalued.  
In a final step, we break down the latter composite misalignment index into its undervaluation and 
overvaluation components. We define the dummy  which takes the value of 1 when the real 
exchange rate is undervalued and 0 otherwise. Our undervaluation and overvaluation variables are 
then computed respectively as follows: 
)*+, = $%&&&  .     4	  and  /++, = $%&&& . 1 − 	    5	 
3.2. Data 
The analysis is conducted on a large panel of 72 countries observed over 1970–2008. The baseline 
dataset comprises annual data for 38 developing countries and 34 advanced economies.9 We have 
strived to consider a sufficiently large number of countries to fully exploit the heterogeneity of 
countries’ experiences – notably, in terms of exchange rate regime and level of development – while 
keeping an acceptable quality of inference in corresponding subsamples.  
We rely on data from the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011) to compute our 
enhanced-PPP misalignment indexes. This provides us with the most up-to-date enhanced-PPP 
misalignment estimates, meeting the Subramanian (2010)’s recent call for re-estimation of existing 
figures of PPP-based misalignment (including Rodrik, 2008 and Reisen, 2009 among others). Indeed, 
the latter suffer from numerous problems. First, as shown by Johnson et al. (2009), there was a 
valuation problem in the PWT methodology that led to important variations across different versions 
of PWT and across time, implying weak robustness of PPP misalignment estimates based on those 
versions.10 Second, some authors like Deaton and Heston (2009) argue that the price level of GDP 
(i.e., the RER) for China has been overvalued by about 20% in the previous versions of PWT.  
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 Table A1 displays an exhaustive list of countries considered in this paper. Following Rodrik (2008), we consider as 
developing countries, those that have a per capita GDP lower than 6000 US$.    
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 In fact, the warning includes also data for years (countries) other than the benchmark year (country) for which detailed 
price data have been collected. We think that this should not be of great concern here since (i) only five countries are “none 
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Exploiting data from recently issued PWT 7.0, which correct for the aforementioned problems, our 
estimates yield a value of -0.16 for the parameter  in equation (2) – with a t statistic around 12. 
Figure A1 and Table A3 respectively report the distributions of our undervaluation and overvaluation 
indexes, as well some summary statistics of these variables. Anecdotally, we find an undervaluation 
rate around 35% over the post 2000 period for China (Rodrik, 2008 and Reisen, 2009 reported 50% 
and 12% respectively).  
4. Undervaluation, TFP and growth: empirical evidence 
4.1. Undervaluation and growth: the direct effect 
We start by ascertaining the growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation. Such an exercise is of 
particular interest, given the lack of consensus among economists on this issue (see Nouira and 
Sekkat, 2012 for the latest act of this current and intense debate). Our basic model to investigate this 
question is specified as follows.      
1234ℎ =  + 61234ℎ76 + 8)*+, + 9/++, + : +  +     6	 
where 1234ℎ is the per capita GDP growth rate, )*+, and /++, are respectively 
our undervaluation and overvaluation indexes, and  is a set of common growth determinants. 
Building on the voluminous cross-country growth literature, we consider the most common growth 
determinants in empirical studies. These include: (i) the quality of institutions (proxied by the variable 
polity2 from the Center for Systemic Peace database, see Acemoglu and al, 2005), (ii) fixed 
investment to GDP, (iii) human capital (measured as the gross secondary school enrollment rate, see 
Mankiw et al., 1992), (iv) government consumption in percentage of GDP (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 
1995), (v) trade openness (given by the sum of exports and imports to GDP, Edwards, 1998), (vi) the 
inflation rate, and (vii) commodity terms of trade. Data are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and World Economic Outlook (WEO) databases. As witnessed by the presence of 
the lagged value of the dependent variable among right-hand-side variables, the model is formulated in 
dynamic fashion. This specification choice is corroborated by the significance of this lagged value in 
all the estimates. Our primary interest lies on 8 which measures the effect of real exchange rate 
undervaluation on growth.  
A crucial question one must rule on before estimating this model is the identification of causality 
between undervaluation and growth, i.e. the potential endogeneity of the real exchange rate (as well as 
many of the control variables). Even though widely admitted, this issue is not always properly 
addressed in the empirical literature. In fact, this has been one of the sources of criticisms from 
detractors of the growth enhancing effect of undervaluation. Accordingly, we base our main 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
benchmark” in our sample (ii) as stressed by Johnson et al. (2009), the fact of pooling data over long periods reduces 
considerably the effect of non-benchmark years.      
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conclusions on estimates using dynamic panel GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; and 
Blundell and Bond, 1998). These estimators provide an efficient identification strategy by using an 
internal instrumentation structure (see Roodman, 2006 for a comprehensive user’s guide). We rely 
more particularly upon the Blundell and Bond (1998)’s estimator as it provides the most efficient 
identification strategy (see Bond et al., 2001). Moreover, as suggested by conventional econometric 
practice, we systematically check that: (i) both p-values associated with the Sargan and Hansen 
statistics do not reject the over-identifying restrictions confirming the validity of the instruments; (ii)  
the AR(1) test statistics rejects the null of no first-order autocorrelation in error terms, while the 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) fails to reject the null of no second-order autocorrelation in residuals, 
reinforcing the validity of our instrumentation strategy (the use of lagged values of regressors); (iii) 
the instruments count is sufficiently low to avoid problems related to the “over-fitting bias” (see 
Roodman, 2007).  
The results are presented in Table 1. Columns 1.1 to 1.4 report the estimation of our basic model in 
equation (6), using standard fixed (column 1.1) and random effects panel estimators (column 1.2), the 
“difference GMM” estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991, column 1.3) and the “system GMM” 
estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998, column 1.4). Regardless of the estimator used, real exchange rate 
undervaluation appears to be significantly associated with a growth surge. The estimated coefficient is 
quite stable across estimations. A 1% increase in the magnitude of undervaluation leads to a 0.028 
percentage points increase in the growth rate – according to the Blundell-Bond estimate. Interestingly, 
this result turns out to be robust to the introduction of variables such as trade openness and terms of 
trade, indicating that the estimated effect of undervaluation on growth cannot be explained by a simple 
export-led growth story. A more structural mechanism is at stake. 
As expected, /++, comes with a negative sign in all estimates, witnessing the strong anti-growth 
effect of currency overvaluation. On average, a 1% increase in the latter is associated with a 0.021 
percentage points contraction in growth. Noticeably, overvaluation appears to undermine growth in a 
roughly similar degree that undervaluation enhances it.  
Columns 1.5 to 1.8 address the heterogeneity issue and investigate alternative specification choices.11 
We first replicate our baseline estimation using subsamples of developing and developed countries – 
respectively in columns 1.5 and 1.6 – to ensure that our findings do not hide diverging dynamics in 
these two groups. It appears that the growth enhancing effect of undervaluation is observable in both 
groups of countries. However, consistent with precedent findings in the literature (Aguirre and 
Calderòn, 2005), this effect seems stronger in developing countries. A 1% increase in the magnitude of 
undervaluation is associated on average with a 0.04 percentage points enhancement in developing 
countries’ growth, while it spurs growth by 0.012 percentage points in developed countries. In column 
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depreciations of the exchange rate that usually follow them are likely to be associated with a decline in growth. 
10 
 
1.7, we explore whether currency undervaluation impacts growth differently in pegged, intermediate 
or floating exchange rate regimes. To this end, we add to our baseline specification the interactions 
Table1: Real exchange rate undervaluation and growth: the direct effect 
  
Dependent variable: GDP growth rate 
Full 
sample 
 
Full 
sample 
 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
  
FE RE GMM           
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 
Growth(-1) -0.0543 0.251*** 0.265*** 0.153** 0.287** 0.0991** 0.194*** 0.161* 
(-1.592) (3.782) (2.781) (2.033) (2.120) (2.343) (3.205) (1.739) 
UNDERVAL 2.176*** 1.532*** 2.542** 2.783** 3.972*** 1.176* 2.508*** 2.791*** 
(5.502) (3.963) (2.216) (2.264) (3.753) (1.760) (3.017) (4.624) 
OVERVAL -2.853*** -1.287*** -2.316*** -2.083* -3.274*** -2.197*** -1.989** -2.431*** 
(-2.902) (-2.752) (-3.682) (-1.781) (-5.752) (-2.830) (-2.103) (-2.975) 
Institutions quality 0.0628 0.0842 0.0954 0.0691 0.0927*** 0.00971 0.0812* 0.0842 
(1.419) (1.478) (1.591) (1.047) (3.532) (0.0902) (1.699) (1.608) 
Investment 3.165*** 1.962*** 1.952* 2.546* 1.963* 3.001*** 2.731** 2.850* 
(2.981) (3.564) (1.752) (1.754) (1.708) (3.731) (1.980) (1.725) 
Human capital -0.0248 -0.0851 0.145*** 0.104** 0.109** 0.0651 0.123** 0.134** 
(-1.243) (-0.126) (2.851) (2.463) (2.001) (1.528) (2.062) (2.290) 
Public expenditures -1.365 -1.265 -0.152 -0.130 -0.189 0.0871 -0.201 -1.502 
(-1.137) (-0.741) (-1.510) (-0.0434) (-1.017) (0.137) (-1.372) (-0.571) 
Inflation -3.281** -3.148*** -2.287*** -1.663*** -1.254* -2.901** -1.754*** -1.710** 
(-2.276) (-3.345) (-3.981) (-3.344) (-1.724) (-2.085) (-3.952) (-2.201) 
Trade openess -0.521 -0.434* 0.323 -0.0799 1.558 0.438* 0.338 
(-0.919) (-1.752) (0.0765) (-1.184) (1.592) (1.702) (0.721) 
Terms of trade -0.761 -0.705 2.279 1.041 0.928 1.353* 1.174 
(-1.298) (-1.102) (0.899) (1.499) (1.597) (1.716) (1.499) 
Pegged regimes*UNDERVAL 0.451 
(1.096) 
Intermediate Regimes *UNDERVAL 0.213 
(0.174) 
Pegged Regimes 0.0025 
(1.295) 
Intermediate Regimes 0.0073 
(1.472) 
UNDERVAL
2
 -3.007 
(-1.581) 
OVERVAL
2
   -4.162*** 
(-5.729) 
No of Obsv 444   444   365 373 190 183 370 373 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  p-value 0.752 0.598 0.921 0.742 0.625  0.592 
Sargan p-value 0.529 0.652 0.127 0.239 0.836  0.410 
Hansen p-value 0.218 0.358 0.228 0.391 0.413 0.374 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of countries 71 71 70 70 38 32 70 70 
No of Instruments         26 30 30 31 34 32 
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 Note: *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. We recode 
overvaluation figures to be positive for simplicity of the interpretation.  
 
 
between undervaluation and two of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)’s de facto exchange-rate-regime 
dummy variables (recently updated to 2010). More specifically, we introduce dummies identifying 
pegged and intermediate regimes, with floating regimes being kept as the reference. Here also our 
main conclusions remain unaltered by this partition of the sample. Finally, we allow the effects of 
undervaluation and overvaluation on growth to depend on the size of the misalignment in column 1.8. 
As in Rodrik (2008), we find no evidence of non linearity in the relationship between undervaluation 
and growth. On the other hand, it appears that overvaluation hurts growth at an escalating marginal 
rate.  
Turning to the other growth determinants, only the lagged growth rate, human capital, investment and 
the inflation rate appear to explain robustly the current growth rate and display the expected sign. A 
better quality of institutions is associated with stronger growth only in the developing countries 
subsample. In accordance with Barro (1991), government spending is inversely related to growth in 
most of the specifications (excepted for developed countries), but this effect is statistically significant 
in none of the models. Similarly, the impacts of trade openness and terms of trade display little 
robustness across estimates and appear to be statistically weak.12    
4.2. Undervaluation and growth: the TFP growth channel 
The growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation having been assessed, this section takes the next step 
of the analysis by conducting an empirical investigation on the TFP growth channel. Most 
interestingly, taking advantage on the findings of the precedent section, it provides an assessment of 
the relative magnitude of the TFP growth channel compared to the capital accumulation channel.   
4.2.1. Measuring total factor productivity 
The total factor productivity index used in this paper is taken from Bosworth and Collins (2003) - and 
updated to 2008. These authors developed a carefully designed growth accounting (and growth 
regression) procedure that stands as a benchmark in the econometrics of growth modeling (Bhalla, 
2007). Total factor productivity is here the residue of an augmented production function à la Solow –
educational attainment is added to the standard model to control for quality changes in the workforce. 
Some descriptive statistics of this variable are presented in Table A3. 
                                                           
12
 The negative effect of trade openness on growth in some of the regressions, especially in the developing countries 
subsample, probably owes much to the episodes of trade liberalization, whose negative impacts in several countries in the 
sample have been documented by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Besides, the statistically weak effect of institutions in 
developed countries probably stems from the low variability of the polity2 index – which has been used as the proxy of 
institutions – across countries in this subgroup.  
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This total factor productivity index is used despite the criticism it has been the object of. The more 
recurrent of these criticisms emphasizes the nebulous character of the contents of such Solow 
residuals. In fact, in addition to the information on productivity gains, the Solow residual captures all 
the factors outside the “mechanics of production” such as political turmoil, changes in institutions, 
droughts, external shocks, conflicts etc. Nevertheless, numerous factors can reduce here the incidence 
of this drawback. First, the fact of considering 5 year time periods can mitigate the effect of short-term 
external shocks. Second, even if the estimated level of TFP can be impacted by external factors, we 
expect the variations in the TFP level to be primarily driven by changes in productivity. Third, in the 
very long run as here, external shocks could be expected to cancel each other out.      
4.2.2. Empirical evidence 
Our test strategy consists of two steps. We first investigate the link between real exchange rate 
undervaluation and TFP growth. Then, following Rodrik (2008), we check whether the component of 
TFP growth that is directly induced by undervaluation is positively associated with growth.  
From undervaluation to TFP growth 
The econometrical model to assess the effect of undervaluation on TFP growth is specified as follows:  
< =  + 6<76 + 8)*+, + 9/++, + := +  +      7	 
where < is the total factor productivity growth rate, )*+, and /++, are 
respectively our undervaluation and overvaluation indexes, = is a set of usual productivity 
determinants,  is a time fixed effect and  is the error term. As in the previous section, we follow 
previous empirical studies by including the ensuing standard productivity determinants: (i) human 
capital (Nelson and Phelps, 1966), (ii) trade openness (Edwards, 1998), (iii) financial development 
(proxied by the stock of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions, expressed as a percentage of GDP, see Alfaro et al., 2009), (iv) quality of institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005) and (v) investment to GDP (Aschauer, 1989). Excepted for the financial 
development index, which is drawn from Beck et al. (2000), all these variables are taken from the 
same sources as previously. Parameter  8 bears our primary interest.  
In order to ward off any endogeneity problem and guarantee the identification of a causal relationship 
from undervaluation to TFP growth, our main conclusions are based on estimates using the “system 
GMM” estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Additional estimates using various 
estimators are however reported for robustness purposes.  
Table 2 displays the results of the estimations. It reports estimates using standard fixed and random 
effects panel estimators (columns 2.1 and 2.2, respectively), in addition to the “difference” and 
“system GMM” estimators (columns 2.3 and 2.4, respectively).  Real exchange rate undervaluation 
appears to be positively and significantly associated with TFP growth in all estimates. A 10% increase 
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in the magnitude of real exchange rate undervaluation leads on average to a 0.056 percentage points 
improvement in TFP growth – according to the system GMM estimator. Such a magnitude implies that 
a 35% undervaluation of the currency, i.e. our mean estimate for China over the post 2000 period, 
fosters productivity growth on average by 2%. This is a quite sizable effect, as it represents half to 
two-thirds of the annual productivity growth in a handful of countries in the sample. Most importantly, 
this finding turns out to be particularly robust: it survives to the exclusion of high misalignment 
observations (undervaluation and overvaluation rates over 50%), as in column 2.5, suggesting that the 
underlying mechanism behind this empirical regularity operates even in the case of relatively moderate 
misalignments. Note that overvaluation, on the other hand, is consistently associated with a shrink in 
productivity growth.  
Table 2: Real exchange rate undervaluation and TFP growth 
  Dependent variable: TFP growth 
Full 
sample 
 
Full 
sample 
 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Full 
sample 
Full 
sample 
  
FE RE GMM             
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 
TFP growth(-1) -0.153* 0.163* 0.214** 0.168** 0.252* 0.201* 0.226** 0.196*** 0.137* 
 
(-1.892) (1.878) (1.997) (2.111) (1.901) (1.823) (2.390) (4.524) (1.843) 
UNDERVAL 2.063** 0.268** 4.927** 5.364*** 5.623*** 5.587*** 2.132* 3.472** 3.632** 
 
(2.385) (1.998) (1.990) (3.193) (4.934) (3.475) (1.835) (2.311) (2.362) 
OVERVAL -1.593** -0.169* -2.754* -3.820* -3.301** -4.235** -3.298** -3.721** -3.964** 
 
(-2.165) (-1.720) (-1.706) (-1.815) (-2.198) (-2.264) (-1.982) (-1.995) (-1.972) 
Institutions quality 0.0534* 0.104** 0.106* 0.0870** 0.101 0.0932* 0.0799* 0.126* 0.123* 
 
(1.698) (2.007) (1.874) (2.130) (1.524) (1.697) (1.793) (1.698) (1.903) 
Investment 1.045** 0.787** -2.165 -1.661 -3.002* -1.213 1.928** -1.342 -1.732 
 
(2.165) (2.258) (-0.992) (-1.432) (-1.832) (-0.642) (2.221) (-0.542) (-1.265) 
Human capital 0.0973** 0.0765* 0.102** 0.0701* 0.117** 0.131* 0.0767** 0.0953** 0.0843** 
 
(1.929) (1.729) (2.001) (1.991) (2.154) (1.892) (2.681) (1.985) (2.452) 
Trade openess 0.243 0.372 1.976*** 1.741** 1.697 -2.511*** 5.234*** 1.852* 2.586* 
 
(1.585) (0.243) (2.753) (2.066) (1.524) (-3.314) (3.423) (1.765) (1.985) 
Financial depth -0.765** 0.294* 1.459* 0.617 1.342* 1.302 1.321** 1.543 1.274 
(-2.043) (1.891) (1.701) (0.625) (1.731) (1.467) (2.315) (1.591) (1.609) 
Pegged Regimes*UNDERVAL 0.996 
 
(0.567) 
Intermediate Regimes *UNDERVAL 0.231 
 
(1.128) 
Pegged Regimes 0.0061 
(1.004) 
Intermediate Regimes 0.0076 
 
(0.875) 
UNDERVAL2 -3.492** 
 
(-2.367) 
OVERVAL
2
 -3.732** 
 
(-2.275) 
No of Obsv 451   451   372 380 371 193 187 377 380 
AR(1) p-value 
  
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  p-value 
  
0.675 0.687 0.745 0.175 0.654 0.753 0.654 
Sargan p-value 
  
0.853 0.784 0.163 0.243 0.523 0.765 0.543 
Hansen p-value 
  
0.687 0.278 0.287 0.634 0.792 0.457 0.265 
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Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of countries 71 71 71 71 71 38 33 71 71 
No of Instruments         26 29 29 28 28 32 30 
Note: *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. We recode overvaluation figures to 
be positive for simplicity of the interpretation.  
In what follows, we submit these baseline results to a series of robustness tests. We start by breaking 
down the sample into subsamples of developing and developed countries respectively in columns 2.6 
and 2.7. The results globally echo the findings of the precedent section: undervaluation of the currency 
seems to boost productivity in both advanced and less developed countries, but this effect turns out to 
be stronger in developing countries. In column 2.8, we further address the heterogeneity issue by 
exploring the possibility of a differentiated effect of currency undervaluation across exchange rate 
regimes. Here also we find little evidence of such heterogeneity in the impact of undervaluation.  
Next we examine the possibility of threshold effects in the link between real exchange rate 
undervaluation and TFP growth. Such an assumption seems particularly plausible given the possibility 
of diminishing marginal social returns of investment in the tradable sector. Indeed, an implicit 
assumption in the formulation of our hypothesis of test is the existence of at least constant marginal 
social returns of investment in the tradable sector. For the shift of domestic production (from the non-
tradable sector to the tradable sector), associated with undervaluation, to occur along with a 
continuous increase in the economy-wide productivity, the productivity gain from one additional unit 
of production in the tradables sector needs to always exceed the productivity loss due to the last unit of 
production withdrawn from the non-tradable sector. In the case of diminishing marginal social returns 
of investment in the tradable goods sector, the economy-wide level of productivity could decrease, 
beyond a certain level of production transfer. As a result, the estimate presented in the last column of 
Table 2 allows for non linearity in the link between RER misalignment and TFP growth, by adding the 
square of )*+, (as well as /++,) in our TFP growth regression. Results indicate that 
undervaluation of the currency boosts the overall productivity level in the economy, but beyond a 
certain magnitude of misalignment this effect is reversed.13  
From TFP increase to growth 
This section provides an answer for the second interrogation raised by this paper: does the 
undervaluation-induced TFP growth significantly foster growth? Our approach consists in testing 
whether the component of TFP growth directly induced by undervaluation is positively associated 
with growth. Concretely, we estimate the following equations:  
< =  + 6<76 + 8)*+, + 9)*+,
8 +  +        8	 
1234ℎ = @ + @61234ℎ76 +  @8<AB + @9 +  + C       9	 
                                                           
13
 A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the type -3.632/-2*3.492 suggests an undervaluation threshold of 54%. 
Another promising way to estimate the latter is to rely on panel smooth transition regressions (see Béreau et al., 2012)   
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where <AB  is the predicted value of < from equation (8). It captures the total factor productivity 
growth that is fully imputable to RER undervaluation. Then, equation (9) tests whether the TFP 
growth that is directly caused by undervaluation significantly impacts growth. The results of these 
estimates are reported in Table 3: column 3.1 for equation (8) and column 3.2 for equation (9).14 
Results of this latter estimate suggest that the undervaluation-induced TFP growth is positively and 
significantly associated with a growth surge. A 1% further increase in the TFP growth caused by RER 
undervaluation is associated with, roughly, a half percentage point increase in growth. This shows that 
at least part of the effect of undervaluation transits through an improvement in the economy-wide 
productivity level.  
4.3. TFP growth versus capital accumulation 
As emphasized before, the literature on the transmission channels of the effect of undervaluation on 
growth points towards two dominant channels: the TFP growth channel, which has been examined 
above, and the capital accumulation channel (Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007; Bhalla, 2007 and 
Rodrik, 2008). This section provides an estimation of the relative magnitudes of these two competing 
transmission channels. Our strategy consists in comparing the direct (total) effect of undervaluation on 
growth to the indirect effect that passes through the TFP growth channel (Figure 1).  
We have shown in column 3.2 of Table 3 that a 1% increase in the TFP growth caused by 
undervaluation leads on average to a 0.46% growth surge. Knowing that a 1% increase in 
undervaluation causes on average a 0.036% increase in TFP growth (column 2.9 of Table 2), we can 
say that on average a 1% increase in undervaluation improves growth by 0.017% (0.46*0.036) via the 
TFP growth channel. This is the indirect effect of undervaluation on growth that transits through the 
TFP growth channel. 
 
                                                Direct effect: column 1.4 of Table 1 
 
Effect of undervaluation on TFP growth     Effect of the “undervaluation-induced TFP growth” 
 Column 2.9 of Table 2                on the growth rate column 3.2 of Table 3 
 
                     
                    Figure 1: Strategy of test  
 
 
                                                           
14
 Note that a rigorous implementation of our test strategy would require the computation of bootstrapped standard errors to 
correct for potential inference bias related to the inclusion of a predicted variable among right-hand-side variables. However, 
the sample size is not sufficient for this procedure to be applied (data were divided into 8 periods of five years averages). 
        Growth Undervaluation 
TFP growth 
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Our estimate of the direct effect of undervaluation on growth, in column 1.4 of Table 1, suggests a 
magnitude of 0.028% enhancement in growth for each 1% further increase in undervaluation. This 
means that the TFP growth channel accounts for around 60% (0.017/0.028) of the total effect of 
undervaluation on growth, exceeding in magnitude the capital accumulation channel.   
Of course, this calculation should not be taken as a precise estimation of the magnitude of the TFP 
growth channel. These numbers are only indicative. However, what can be safely said is that the 
amplitude of the TFP growth channel is not marginal. A large part of the effect of real exchange rate 
undervaluation on growth passes through an increase in the overall productivity level.  
 
Table 3: Identification of the transmission channel 
  TFP growth Growth 
GMM 
3.1 3.2 
TFP growth(-1) 0.163** 
 
 
(1.993) 
 Growth(-1) 0.172* 
 
(1.786) 
TF7P 4.589*** 
 
(3.875) 
UNDERVAL 4.462***  
(5.454) 
 
UNDERVAL
2
 -4.551***  
(-4.654) 
Human capital 0.0522** 
 
(1.987) 
Trade openess -0.799 
 
(-1.002) 
Investment 0.865* 
 
(1.695) 
Institutions quality 0.129 
 
(1.376) 
Terms of trade 0.865* 
 
(1.703) 
Public expenditures -1.476 
(-0.854) 
Inflation -2.120*** 
(-3.654) 
No of Obsv 439 362 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 
AR(2)  p-value 0.865 0.765 
Sargan p-value  0.343 0.976 
Hansen p-value 0.412 0.354 
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Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
No of Group 73 69 
No of Instruments 10 23 
Note: *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
5. Robustness check: an alternative measure of real exchange rate undervaluation 
As stated before, the PPP-based undervaluation index used in the previous section is not the only 
available measurement standard. We have primarily presented the results based on this undervaluation 
measure because of data availability issues in the computation of the (main) alternative measure in the 
literature: the BEER-based undervaluation index.15 In this section, we explore the robustness of our 
conclusions to the use of this undervaluation measure. Data are available here for a panel of 61 
countries over 1980 – 2006 (versus 72 countries over 1970 – 2008 previously). Table A1 displays an 
exhaustive list of countries considered in this section.   
Conceptually, exchange rate misalignment is defined here as the deviation of the market real effective 
exchange rate (REER) from its equilibrium level. The latter is defined as the REER that is consistent 
with the level of economic fundamentals. Two hypotheses are critical to this procedure: the choice of 
fundamentals and the choice of the estimator used to compute the equilibrium REER. Results can vary 
substantially depending on these assumptions (see Aguirre and Calderòn, 2005 for example). 
We use in this paper the most common economic fundamentals in both the empirical and the 
theoretical literatures (Edwards, 1988, Aguirre and Calderòn, 2005; inter alia): the terms of trade (tot), 
net foreign assets to GDP (nfa), trade openness (trade), public expenditures (g) and a productivity gap 
variable (prod) aiming at capturing Balassa-Samuelson effects. The following long run REER 
equation is then estimated: 
2EE2 =  + 63 + 8FG + 92GHE + :1 + I&23H +    10	 
2EE2 is here the CPI-based real effective exchange rate. The weights used for its calculation are 
computed as the share of each partner in average values of imports and exports of goods and services 
over the 2000-2007 period. An increase in this variable implies a real appreciation. For the Balassa-
Samuelson variable (&23H), our first-best measure would have been the ratio of productivities 
between the tradable and non-tradable sectors based on ISIC code sector classifications. However, due 
to the lack of pertinent data, this variable is proxied by the ratio of the domestic country’s GDP 
relative to the weighted GDP of trade partners, using the same weighting matrix as for 2EE2 (Aguirre 
and Calderòn, 2005). The remaining variables are taken from the WDI and WEO databases. All series 
are in logarithm except for nfa.  
                                                           
15
 Data availability concerns were primarily related to the Balassa-Samuelson variable as well as terms of trade data. 
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The real effective exchange rate is expected to appreciate with (i) positive developments in terms of 
trade, leading to an improvement in the trade balance, (ii) an increase in trade restrictions, resulting in 
higher domestic prices (iii), a faster tradables – non tradables relative productivity growth at home 
than abroad, in line with the Balassa-Samuelson effect, (iv) an increase in the country’s net foreign 
assets position, due to the implied “transfer effect”, (v) an expansion of the government’s size because 
of the well known “home bias” in public expenditures. In other words all parameters in equation (10) 
are expected to be positive, excepted for that on trade.  
To estimate the long term REER equation, we rely on panel cointegration techniques. As a first step, 
we assess the validity of this equation as a long run relationship by checking both the non-stationarity 
of series and the existence of a cointegration relationship between the REER and fundamentals. 
Results, reported in Table A2, confirm these requirements allowing the estimation of equation (10).16 
Three main estimators are generally considered when estimating panel cointegrating relationships: the 
Fully Modified OLS estimator (FM-OLS, Phillips and Hansen, 1990; Pedroni, 2000), the Dynamic 
OLS estimator (DOLS, Kao and Chiang, 2000) and the Pooled Mean Group estimator (PMG, Pesaran 
et al., 1999). The PMG estimator seems more suitable in the present case since, unlike the two other 
estimators, it allows for short run heterogeneity of parameters across countries. This feature is 
particularly interesting given the heterogeneity of our sample. However, long term homogeneity across 
groups is still assumed with the PMG approach. This assumption has been ascertained by means of a 
Hausman test. The following long run RER relationship is obtained when the PMG estimator is 
applied to equation (10) – t-statistics are presented in parentheses: 
2EE2K = 3.03 + 0.27 3 + 0.12 FG − 0.04 2GHE + 0.00004 1 + 0.06 &23H  11	 
                       (14.64)      (7.39)         (8.02)               (-3.39)              (7.44)               (2.33)    
The BEER-based misalignment (LMNO) is then measured as the deviation of the REER from its 
equilibrium level, where the latter is the fitted value from equation (11) using (Hodrick-Prescott, HP) 
filtered long term values of fundamentals. That is: 
LMNO = log 	 − log 	   12	     and     log 	 = PQR 13	 
where  is the equilibrium real effective exchange rate,  is the current real effective 
exchange rate, P  is the estimated matrix of parameters in equation (11) and QR is the (HP) filtered 
long term value of fundamentals. Thus defined, a positive value of LMNO reveals an 
undervaluation and a negative value of this variable is associated with an overvaluation of the 
                                                           
16
 More specifically, we rely on Maddala and Wu (1999), Pesaran (CIPS, 2007) and Carrion-i Silvestre et al. (LM(λ), 2005)’s 
unit root tests, which all allow for individual heterogeneity in the value of the autoregressive parameter. CIPS and LM(λ) also 
account for cross-sectional dependence and endogeneous structural breaks in the series respectively. For cointegration tests, 
we perform Kao (1999), Pedroni (2004) as well as Westerlund and Persyn (2008)’s tests. In addition of allowing for 
heterogeneous variances across countries like the two other tests, Westerlund and Persyn (2008)’s test also account for cross-
sectional dependence and endogeneous structural breaks in the series.        
19 
 
currency. As previously, we next break down the latter misalignment index into its undervaluation and 
overvaluation components: 
)*+,2 = LMNO  .     14	    and    /++,2 = LMNO . 1 − 	     15	 
where  is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the real exchange rate is undervalued and 0 
otherwise. The distribution of these variables and some summary statistics are reported respectively in 
Figure A2 and Table A3. The correlation between the BEER-based undervaluation and the enhanced-
PPP-based undervaluation index used previously is over 0.3, which is sufficiently low to be used as a 
relevant robustness check.   
Table 4 replicates our main estimates in the previous sections using the BEER undervaluation index. 
As we can see, results are qualitatively similar. Column 4.1 reproduces the estimation of the direct 
effect of undervaluation on growth. A 1% increase in undervaluation boosts growth approximately by 
0.032% according to the BEER-based undervaluation measure (versus 0.028%, previously). In column 
4.2, we replicate our estimation of the indirect effect of undervaluation on TFP growth. The three 
following columns address the sample heterogeneity issue by testing the robustness of our findings 
according to countries’ level of development and exchange rate regime (respectively columns 4.3 - 4.4 
and 4.5). Here also our conclusions are left unchanged. In column 4.6, we explore the possibility of 
threshold effects in the undervaluation-TFP relationship. As before evidence of non linearity is found 
suggesting decreasing marginal social returns of investment in the tradable sector. Finally, column 4.7 
provides evidence that the undervaluation-induced TFP growth fosters growth significantly. On 
average, a 1% increase in the TFP growth caused by undervaluation boosts growth by 0.5%.  
Repeating the simple exercise performed in the previous section, we find here that the TFP growth 
channel accounts for about 71% (0.046*0.50/0.032) of the direct effect of undervaluation on growth, a 
larger magnitude than the one previously found. Adding this latter result to the estimation of the 
precedent section, we can conclude that the effect of undervaluation on growth passes primarily 
through an increase in the overall productivity level.  
Conclusion 
This paper aims at contributing to the current and intense debate among economists on whether 
undervaluation of the currency is growth-enhancing. It carries out the first empirical investigation on 
the TFP growth channel, which constitutes, along with the capital accumulation channel, one of the 
main possible transmission channels of the effect of undervaluation on growth. The takeaway message 
of our assessment is twofold: (i) there is evidence of a productivity channel through which 
undervaluation enhances growth, (ii) this channel seems to convey the most important part of the 
growth-enhancing effect of undervaluation. Such a conclusion has proven to be robust to explicitly 
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separating the effect of undervaluation from that of overvaluation, considering subsamples of 
developing and developed countries and using an alternative measure of exchange rate undervaluation. 
In light of these conclusions, two observations are in order. First, the latter results should be put in 
perspective with the debate on the fundamental driving forces of growth. Traditionally, total factor 
productivity gains have been considered as the motor of growth. This vision has been challenged 
Table 4: Robustness tests: an alternative measure of undervaluation 
  Growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth Growth 
Full sample Full sample 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Full sample Full sample 
              
 
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 
Growth (-1) 0.173** 0.183** 
(2.176) (1.993) 
TFP growth (-1) 0.126* 0.271* 0.745** 0.198*** 0.251*** 
(1.861) (1.790) (2.221) (4.527) (3.306) 
TF7P 0.501*** 
(3.951) 
UNDERVAL2 3.217** 4.729*** 5.403*** 3.116*** 4.564** 4.752*** 
(1.983) (2.691) (3.564) (5.725) (2.187) (4.621) 
OVERVAL2 -4.216* -4.216* -4.743*** -2.141** -4.632** -3.458** 
(1.861) (-1.863) (-3.231) (-1.997) (-2.239) (-2.413) 
UNDERVAL2
2
 -4.542*** 
(-3.853) 
OVERVAL2
2
 -3.001** 
(-2.326) 
Financial depth 1.003 0.102* 0.832** 0.952** 0.647* 
(0.763) (1.817) (1.992) (2.357) (1.791) 
Human capital 0.161** 0.264* 0.243*** 0.152*** 0.145** 0.161** 0.134** 
(1.768) (1.813) (2.932) (3.653) (1.981) (2.265) (2.329) 
Trade openess 1.139 1.314 2.324** 1.595 2.004* 1.785* 0.713 
(1.056) (0.016) (2.183) (0.728) (1.876) (1.767) (1.123) 
Investment -1.257** -1.067* 0.207 0.878 1.101 1.210* 1.064 
(-2.175) (-1.721) (0.315) (1.376) (1.257) (1.699) (1.573) 
Institutions quality 0.651 0.194** 0.163** 0.152 0.206** 0.207*** 0.284* 
(1.307) (2.437) (2.003) 0.654 (2.178) (3.558) (1.708) 
Terms of trade 1.178 1.123* 
(0.581) (1.716) 
Public expenditures -1.587 -1.729* 
(-0.976) (-1.698) 
Inflation -2.076*** -2.115* 
(-3.651) (-2.075) 
Pegged regimes*UNDERVAL2 0.382 
 
(0.108) 
Intermediate Regimes *UNDERVAL2 0.211 
 
(0.319) 
Pegged Regimes 0.0074 
(0.305) 
Intermediate Regimes 0.0050 
(0.823) 
No of Obsv 310 275 127 148 270 275 302 
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.005 0.000 
AR(2)  p-value 0.687 0.287 0.753 0.115 0.642 0.614 0.824 
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Sargan p-value 0.761 0.675 0.782 0.562 0.865 0.421 0.752 
Hansen p-value 0.287 0.548 0.425 0.642 0.624 0.162 0.547 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 56 57 26 31 57 57 56 
No. of Instruments 24 23 24 24 30 26 24 
Note: *significant at 10% **significant at 5% ***significant at 1%. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. We recode 
overvaluation figures to be positive for simplicity of the interpretation.  
 
afterwards by the New Growth Theory and the theory of capital and investment that place a greater 
weight on the increase in human and fixed capitals, resulting in a debate that has occupied the “growth 
accounting” literature over decades. Even though derived from a narrower question, our conclusions 
give some support to the total factor productivity growth view.  
Second, though important, these findings left the crucial question of policy recommendations on the 
sidelines. A straightforward implication for policy would be the pursuing of an active undervaluation 
strategy to enhance productivity and growth. However, such a recommendation would implicitly take 
for granted the economic and political feasibility of a persistent undervaluation strategy. Nothing 
could be less sure. A rigorous analysis of this question would have to provide answers for the 
following interrogations. Is the real exchange rate a policy variable? To what extent can a country 
sustainably pursue an active undervaluation strategy? What are the potential costs of such a policy for 
the country concerned? What are the costs for the other countries? Do these costs outweigh the 
benefits? This seems to be the obvious direction for further research.  
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APPENDIXES  
Table A1: List of countries 
Argentinaab Egypt, Arab Rep,ab Irelandab Mozambiqueab Swedenab   
Australiaab El Salvadorab Israela Netherlandsab Switzerlandab 
Bangladeshab Ethiopiaa Italyab New Zealandab Tanzaniaab 
Boliviaab Finlandab Jamaicaab Norwayab Thailandab 
Brazilab Franceab Japanab Pakistanab Trinidad and Tobagoab 
Canadaab Germanyab Jordanab Panamaab Tunisiaab 
Chileab Ghanaa Kenyaab Paraguayab Turkeyab 
Chinaab Greeceab Korea, Rep.a Peruab Ugandaab 
Colombiaab Guatemalaab Madagascara Philippinesab United Kingdomab 
Costa Ricaab Guyanaab Malawia Portugalab United Statesab 
Cote d'Ivoirea Hondurasab Malaysiaab Senegala Uruguayab 
Cyprusab Icelanda Maliab Sierra Leoneab Venezuela, Rbab 
Denmarkab Indiaab Mauritiusab South Africaab Zambiaab 
Dominican Republicab Indonesiaa Mexicoab Spainab 
Ecuadora Iran, Islamic Rep.a Moroccoab Sri Lankaab     
a
 countries considered in the main body (enhanced PPP undervaluation measure) 
b
 countries considered in the robustness test (BEER-based undervaluation measure) 
 
 
 
Table A2: Unit root tests and cointegration tests 
  Unit root tests 
Variable  Maddala and Wu (1999) MW Pesaran (2007) CIPS 
Carrion-i Silvestre et al. 
(2005) LM(λ) 
log(reer) 0.638 0.247 0.002 
log(trade) 0.966 1.000 0.000 
log(g) 0.164  0.730 0.000 
log(tot) 0.315 0.914  0.001 
log(prod) 0.415 0.635 0.015 
nfa 0.653 0.998  0.000 
Panel cointegration tests 
Kao test 0.00 
Pedroni (2004)’s Panel Rho 0.00 
Pedroni (2004)’s Panel ADF 0.01 
Pedroni (2004)’s Group Rho 0.00 
26 
 
Pedroni (2004)’s Group ADF 0.00 
Westerlund & Persyn (2008)'s Gt 0.00 
Westerlund & Persyn (2008)'s Ga 0.00 
Westerlund & Persyn (2008)'s Pt 0.00 
Westerlund & Persyn (2008)'s Pa 0.00 
Note: Numbers reported here are p-values. All specifications include a maximum of two lags. Unlike the other tests, for 
Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005)'s unit root test, the null is the absence of unit root. For panel cointegration tests the null is the 
absence of cointegration.  
Table A3: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Main body: augmented PPP undervaluation index 
sec. school enrol.  560 61.78009 32.92526 2.769574 145.3379 
Growth 579 2.159531 2.643293 -7.975 13.675 
polity2 579 3.479822 6.879899 -10 10 
P 592 70.95603 32.06572 26.76 320.936 
log(openess) 592 3.999158 .6012694 2.335246 6.082339 
log(tot) 591 4.639807 .2354058 3.569251 5.762963 
log(g) 592 2.125363 .4404285 -.1815219 3.124477 
log(inv) 591 3.101622 .3831444 1.537297 4.31273 
log(fin. depth) 545 -1.043053 .9020635 -4.248216 .8482534 
Inflation 547 .1018516 .1116688 -.0171034 .9602282 
UNDERVAL 295 .1026521 0.276251 0 .939467 
OVERVAL 291 -.1287352 0.426817 -1.085752 0 
log(rgdpch) 592 8.603942 1.280296 5.923876 10.82229 
Tfp 592 .411029 2.179843 -8.005685 12.02041 
Robustness test : BEER based undervaluation index 
polity2 1610 5.322981 6.13217 -10 10 
sec. school enrol.  1311 71.47079 32.63562 3.04276 161.7809 
log(rgdpch) 1608 8.106532 1.521936 4.941475 10.62646 
Growth 1606 1.749751 3.78008 -18.6 22.6 
Nfa 1620 -.4564564 .6288307 -5.815386 1.303079 
Tfp 1620 .3353882 3.716233 -19.9741 25.0532 
log(reer) 1591 4.642401 .2589331 3.529297 6.109248 
log(openess) 1620 3.935506 .6044679 2.206074 5.364807 
log(tot) 1620 4.618721 .1664015 3.747856 5.493103 
log(g) 1620 2.111989 .442009 .9555115 3.248435 
log(inv) 1618 3.0174 .3681421 1.275363 4.279717 
log(fin. depth) 1502 -.957483 .9339712 -4.506366 .696197 
log(prod) 1496 4.617687 .1736356 3.958814 5.254362 
Inflation 1494 .1098625 .1473379 -.106544 .9915609 
UNDERVAL2 745 .1043627 .2641617 0 1.2831 
OVERVAL2 749 -.0922762 .2461811 -1.224452 0 
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Figure A1: Distribution of the enhanced PPP misalignment index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of the BEER-based misalignment index 
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Source: author’s calculations 
